Re-evaluating economic and technological variables to explain global arms production and sales by Kolodziej, Edward A.
Office of
ACDIS K0L:6.
1984
OCCPAP
ACDIS Library
Arms Control, Disarmament
and
International Security
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Re-Evaluating Economic
and Technological Variables 
to Explain Global Arms 
Production and Sales
Edward A Kolodziej 
Professor of Political Science
and
Director
University of Illinois Office of 
Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security
To be published by the 
International Economic Association, 
Macmillan, 1984
Re-Evaluating Economic 
and Technological Variables
to Explain Global Arms 
Production and Sales
Edward A kolodziej 
Professor of Political Science
and
Director
University of Illinois Office of 
Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security
To be published m  the annual of the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI)
1iU "t!a:LÎl!l^ ? ü  f'?0!!0?1? flflfl ^ Chn0lnir1cal Variad»»■k£ faXPlaln ^Igfía.^  Arms Production and
= r :  - « ä  s s r * .»
a ^ - sa -œ r i ? ; rZ ““L£»‘"£
» 3 £ ? ^ S 3 T
persUa s ^ r L San8exí^natxoñn¿fr?LÍnd,theSe £a°t0rs- they are notspending, production or transferí iving foroes behind increased arms 
Philippines, face weák°externaferh ‘,everal «*•*••. like Jexico and the
others t h e J s f  L V  * *  but oontlnue to produce arms
absorb Similarly the s u D e r n o w e M ^ T 1! ^  Produce more arms than they can 
also draw varied'^o^mL^benents ' *  «i0bal arOS transfers,
in the polemical exchanges between wirnu a3?^6? ^ a  ^ tend to be obscured 
has sold Indian railroad rolling stock indacaaha3hin8t°n Ihe Sovlet Onion 
for arms, to acquire hard currency S Î L * ? 0 ™ * *  in eXOhan*eGeneral Dynamics and McDonnell non»i=, everal American corporations, like
and foreign arms sales ^ f i ^ t h r n n , ’ h?avlly dePendent on domestic 
hignly successful -5 for Internationa iorp°ration specifically designed the 
study the development o ^ a  ne" "!g^ter onl^for^ the/ entaS°" •»* under 
°y the Carter administration, which was osteÎ^hiîP°rt’ ZProposal advanced
.r » .
in ßlobalPmilitarydpowerdover°therpastadecad 3ketches the firowth
world, particularly to developing T a t e t  i t di" Uaion the
discussion of arms production transfers a n /  ovides * framework for the
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ohjectivea Ho.ev.r. tr,. .trat.glc-poiltl.ai incentives that 1 . 1  t. the
2organisation of an arms industry and the production of increasingly 
advanced weapons are gradually modified as the economic constraints of 
sustaining an indigenous arms production and of responding to the demands 
of technolo*ical modernisation are understood
i n  thiw early phase of "bounded" rationality, pressures rise to 
produce and sell arms to cut the costs of production through series runs, 
to schedule arms production more efficiently through optimal utilization of 
the factors of production, especially of highly skilled personnel, to seek 
foreign cooperation in covering the mounting cost of research and
anrteí^PHenv and ln ff^eotlvely expanding the nation’s weapons development p oduction oaPa*3^ ^1’-ies, and to limit balance of payment deficits 
attributable to foreign arms purchases Gradually, these subsidiary 
economic-technologicai considerations assume an independent character and
? natlonal priorities Ihese limit realization of an autonomous arms 
£oreUand°h ? ? 3 t e a  fuUy and singularly responsive to internal demand for
support ofeaneind!veñnS ^ ' aoodrdin61y. *>ee °f concern for foreign Support Of an indigenous arms industry Under terms of "bounded"
o r a \ Y í r ¡ arns Proau°tl°n. the resource and technological capabilities 
and the neednto eoono“io ba3e> a«aands for internal welfare expenditures, 
eff*rr?„ ? d t? soaroe weapons producing resources efficiently and effectively set parameters for the independence of the nation’s arms 
complex and its ability to sustain and continuously renovate itself
¿norP^ o d n\ ° f °Ut3ide a33l3tandd through ar ms°3ales ^ "¡^cooperative H andu o r production arrangements with other states P e W and
product!onaSt!?»fr°“ "bounded'‘ rationality in making decisions about arms production, sales, and acquisition to market and developmental rational!tv
and exchanged to enhance the “ ublî^ goohde^rprivateeg ^ ñ ebt2hÍlean *
ÍÍÜÍ.ÍÍÍÍ" *r* Co.ua.rîtSi'iïïiSÎcompetitive pricing for weapons to meet the terms of international 
competition, assured provision of raw materials? partícutaríj energy 
resources (eg , oil) and scarce minerals, access to fore?gn m^rkefs 
produce leadership through arms sales to penetrate foreign^ivll^arkets 
econom by competitors, maintenance of high domestic empîoymen??
“  growth, and investment opportunities Balance of payment concerns 
eu’ aenter on Preserving a state's competitive position and the ' 
Strength of its currency, through Increased arms sales abroad, rather than 
Simply on husbanding scarce foreign reserves ihese welfare c¿nceíns are
party^àdvantage" ' lnternal politidal aa»ands for regime stability and
iilg QrPW.th Qf ililltarv Power and 
Ita diffusion thKQUfth Arma Production and TranafAr«
Jihe “«centralization of military power around the world and its
experienced a decline of 25 percent in thre* ileanwhile, i\orth America
cast, and Last Asia) a h nt „ln three instances (/frica, fiddle
military purposes in 197/ than i n ^ ò o ^ w h i l e  the^rat-3 spent forspending to Gi\r fell for dev^innoa *^  4- w“1ie the ratio of military
( / n to 5 0 percent) this J Ì ! P V Ut/ S by almoat two percentage points
steady, falling only * two-tenths of a° °r d®velopinß states held almost percent uh, i l r h y , tenths of a percentage point from h 1 to s q
spending”ratios^ar^confirmeras Ì L l l T *  Ö° lhes* O^-mil'itary
armed^forces a ^ c o ^ ^ e ^ ^ h ^ f t h e ^ r ^ ^  '“V 03* °f th* 8r0Wtb °f ">rld countries were shrinking bv a l L ^  ,f 3ervloea of the developed
Of the emerging world expanded by ove/th^If m i l l i ^ o ! ^ !  ^  1971 ’ th03e this connection Africa has ohann-^a million or 25 percent In
estimated to have increased from 6 J i T o O O ^ o ^ ^ r o o o  Af??d f o r o e s  arei lddle Last follows with a /fi * » * „ * ! ■  °° t0 1 »ji|0»000 or 111 peroent ihe
Latin America, which has no outstandin^mii??6 ^  3urprisingly,
m  Africa and the Middle Last registered ary °~nfliCts similar to those 
personnel under arms * ß S d a ßain of almost 36 peroent m
range, and ’reliability ^ t h L ^ g r o u i ! ”1^ " ^  f?®reas®<* the «-repower, 
decade lable 1 reinforces the i m î » » L  \  d air sterns in the past 
international aecurìty system c¿árfof a" i^ncreasingly diffuse
£  Ä i ^ i n i ^ ”  t L t  - 3-n^ nUWorîd°sfta0teent:ardS
^  i rS: ^warships and only one state (ialini ^n^ories» 20 were manning modern 
almost 50 emerging countries f !  ? -'Uperaonic aircraft ty ! < ) , , .
advanced as those found in the airforces 3“p®rsoaic aircraft, some as 
included M G  ¿:'s ( orth Korea Svrf! °f d<|Veioped states These 
ecuador), Mrage j's and 5 ’s ( 1 1 ataV 1 ?Q)’ Ja8uars (India, Oman and 
trend continue! as South ,orea !nd P a M s ^ n  I T  >'5 ’S U 6  3tates) Jhe 
t-15's and i-16's, Saudi Arabia to t 15's a!*3«.30?633 t0 1"16'a> iarael to 
251 s by the end of the 1 9 70s 1  ? *yria and lndia> t0 Mld
armor, had various missile ¿ a p a b i l a s  and 6/ l l t l T  po3aaaaed heayy 
in their navies, largely fast, light attack ships U a rS t i ip S
destructive capabilities
exDenri?tnoh’ ar!3 imports illustrate the upward rate of military expenditures and weapons acquisition of developing states iioiL averages for 19ÒO-1972 and 1Q7^ 1Q7 / , 7 states Using bive-year
ail "ni \ h e
a lso  im p r e s s i  ve sxnce3 L ^ r f o r ' r T T 1" 81*  ’ tbe ra te  ° f  «
s t a r t  with ?ha„ 7¿r d e v e l o p e d s t £ e s l 0P° r t 3 13 gM atd r t0
by nearly A3 percent, the former jumped 163 1 i e L e n ^ 6™ 6*1 theJr lmportsincrease in arms imports was in û î n l  iö3 1 percent The greatest rate of
last five years? imports 7n?o AfíÍL L  ln°lu?ln8 "«•«» Africa Over the 
previous five year period Ihe^.iddle fs“»?*' U50 peroent over the
increase of slightly more than «nn 13 also a le*der with an
in arms imports, followed by South and^ast Asia1" Ameri0a 13 in thlrd plaoe
deveioplng^tlt^^to^oduortheir^n^eapons^ th° i“oreaain« tendency of license ihese rangePover heavv armor pona ®J-ther indigenously or under 
helicopters, missiles, Ind warshins^ L *supersonic and subsonic aircraft, 
able to free itself ^ o m  foreían SLooo T *  °f the3a 3tat®a haa p®®¿ 
variety of reasons to b" díscífsed Seïo^0?; í"** haVe been abla’ for a leverage vis-a-vis the develoDed ahat °W t0 increase their bargaining
need not only are develo> ng states able ío““11^ “8 th° weapona that they 
ever before but they are also able ro a f p™ duo® more weapons than 
Of sophisticated weapons systems ifin and fabricate a larger variety
the Middle bast which^roduce weapons^n^our^mat’ ASl? ’ Latin America, and 
armored vehicles, tactical missiles aío four1maJ°r categories— aircraft, 
Which are covered in the surîe? are’no? a ^  Vfaaela ™ ®  2Ö states 
independence that they have achieved ^stinguished by the level of
defined by Andrew Boss o n t  graded six o^nt ^ T 80^  lhe3e leVela> 
assembly at the lowest pomt^of capability L  ? * l e * range from lioensed 
licensed system production, Systemmodi r, L í  u °®“sed component production, 
dependent H A 0 and producLln? a^d ? ^ epe°Len? T tsucceeding higher levels on the scale 8 B A h and production at
numbe;nor:?at0estpLdW::iPnOgSa0pí:?^¿?:rt? í L aí:e li3t3d 13 ^ ®  2 , the 
they have more than doubled in the d e e L L í  .L33 8rown’ ln several oases 
areas bear particular no^ce Ì e L ^ L o  192° SeV6ral
producing fighters grew from one to r?L * d Í90?’ the nu“*>®r of states 
and helicopters from I to U  I v Í L f n  t h a L L Î ^ T 3 fr°" f°“r t0 11 • 
developing world producing aircraft do’ubí?d r f  3tatea in tl>e 
naval craft producers climbed from 15 to 2j withr?i%iiinifloantSíIIIÍlarly ’ 
the number of states capable of producing patrol ^ d  supporí c r l f H 8 “
increased from two to five and number of states produoing tanks
five ihe total number of produoing s^tea“" ^ . ^ : ”  to"""
5produjgrs of tactical missiles tripled in the same period from three to 
nine Producers of SAM missiles leaped from zero to five, ^ those 
producing anti-tank weapons, from one to seven Pive states
(Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, and South Africa) produce arms at some 
level of in iependent capability in all four major categories
Ihese igures also imply a high stage of technological development 
since aircraft, missiles, electronics, and aircraft engines require a broad 
scientific, engineering, and industrial base However much countries, like 
China or india, may be still considered underdeveloped, measured by GNP and 
per capita income figures, they have been able to accumulate the 
technological systems to produce advanced military equipment One can 
metaphorically speak of a "Belgium" emerging from India or a "Netherlands" 
arising from an otherwise underdeveloped China lhe same process of 
modernization, with military technology as the spearhead, may be seen to be 
operating in other states, like Brazil, Pakistan, and Argentina 15 
iodernization is seen to be partially a function of a technologically 
advanced warfighting and economic system, linked to a capacity to sell arms 
and military know-how abroad
lhe interest in advanced military technology is associated logically 
with still another indicator of the growing military capability of 
developing states the proliferation of nuclear technology and weapons 
india s explosion of a nuclear device in 1974 ended any remaining illusions 
that nuclear proliferation might be arrested in the developing world
afkíhspta?; t0 eportS » 13 raPidly approaching the explosionof the first Islamic bomb Other candidates for nuolear status
include Iraq, laiwan, South Africa, South ivorea, Brazil, and Argentina
hany analysts assume that Israel has acquired the necessary technology 
as assembled, short of testing, several nuclear bombs and
Bounded Rationality and Lconomlo and 
laS.?,ntlYQ.9 to Produce. Transfer, and -lechnplQftlqfllAccumulate Arms
ihe mounting cost of new weapon systems is a major problem facing arms 
producers and military establishments L igure 1 sketches the increasing 
cost of American tactical aircraft from 1940 to 19Ö0 The trend line is 
steeply upward, rising from approximately $100,000 a copy in the 1940s to 
an average of over $10 million in 19Ö0
These same upward cost curves can also be discovered by comparing the 
cost figures for tanks, carriers, and fighter airoraft between earlier and 
later models As bigure 2 notes, the Sherman tank whioh cost $140,000 in 
1940 is dwarfed by the estimated price of the newly planned XM-1 tank which 
will cost almost six times as much lhe Lssex aircraft carrier cost $225 
million in World War 11, the Nimitz class carrier costs approximately five 
times as much Similarly, the price of the b-4 fighter was $3 5 million m  
I9o0 while the b-14 requires an outlay approaching $20 million a copy
lhe rising costs of new weapons place great strain on the military 
establishments and economies of supplier states and recipients Increased 
costs mean that fewer systems can be purchased to fulfill a state's 
strategic needs Meanwhile, resources are drained from civilian segments 
of the economy and decision-makers must face a choice of cutting
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FIGURE l1
Source U S , Department of Defense, Statement of William Perry, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Fiscal Year 1980, 
(January, 1979), p 1-8
FIGURE 21
The trend in procu. c ncm costs o f weapons systems Examples used arc aircraft carriers (indicated by names) tanks ¿Sh am *» m
numbers) and fiihur aircraft (F numbers) Tank data me for 1 000th unit a i r c r a f t ^ t a f o M ^ ur ^  í í
remove the costs of milauon and quantity changes a u  data arc normalized to
Source Jacques Gansler, The Defense Industry (Cambridge
p 16
MIT Press, 1980) »
6expenditures for puolic welfare or accepting higher rates of inflation 
potentially damaging to the economy he rising costs of weapons 
development and production tend to have an ironic impact on global arms 
production nd transfers One would expect that the value of arms produced 
and transfei red would increase as a result of the upward push of prices for 
military goods and services Closer examination of the behavior of supplier 
and recipient states suggests, however, that the upward sloping price curve 
for armaments, whether purchased for home or foreign consumption“ cannot be 
solely explained by reference to price inflation for arms As the 
discussion in part one above suggests, world demand for arms remains high
rl3i? V ° osts it would appear that the demand for arms tanelastic relative to civilian consumer products
suDDliarrhL»Ur0Pe^  ?tates are a guide it would appear that major arms 
? ? !  aousht to control their cost curves either by meeting and
even stimulating the demand for arms abroad or by co-development and 
production accords with other arms producers, inbludint states
increasing sales to other countries has a number of eoonomic^enefits It 
spreads the cost of research, development, and p r o d u c t ^ H S e r  a larger
°f ?nlts’ Producing downward pressures on the price of a particular
fashionSn! , 1'roduotlon schedules can be arranged in more orderly fashion over longer periods of time if domestic and foreign purchases can 
e balanced aintaining employment also tends to become more manageable
polic;-maRersS;henethe°surve f " ? 0*3 ? ”  V,Py "UOh the "lnda French !u / n *  , r? , th surSe in Irench arms exports first began in the
gÍ^ÜsÜal^0 0Ut
Irc 1? irenoh mllltary spending relative to GAP between I960 and 1960 
brops m  defense spending are particularly noticeable after the olSse of 
the Algerian war in 1962 and after the hay events in 196b Defense
”  « V w / S T S T  r*u  6 2percent in 1900 to A 2 by 1969 Lven this lower level of defense 
expenditures could not be sustained after 1968, and it continued to fall 
first precipitately after 1966. and then gradually though most of tht 
IWOs, reaching a floor of 3 6 percent for 19/6-19/6 h» „???,.
^  t  “ “  ï ¡ ¿ S r
SSSÍ5 ; F" = “ SSÜ2Ü; 5.;r v ; ss.iasiar:s -  •£ r r F~  .o?1;.1:;"
n0f„p!hat 13 0f “0re lntere3t 13 the shift within the defense budget
tween procurement and personnel expenditures During the 19o0s once the
TABLE 3
FRENCH DEFENSE BUDGET WITH SELECTED COMPONENTS 
FOR PROCUREMENT AND PERSONNEL, AS 
A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL GOVERNMENTAL 
SPENDING AND GNP 
1960-1980
(m billions of dollars)
defense Budget
ear
Total
(initial)
Procure­
ment / Personnel /
Governmental
Total
Budget
4
of Total 
Budget GNP / of GNP
1960 3 35 1 21 36 2 2 14 63 8 11 75 28 5 54 03 6 2
'961 3 41 1 15 33 8 2 26 66 2 12 72 26 8 58 79 5 81962 3 50 1 17 33 5 2 33 66 5 14 17 24 7 64 81 $ 4963 3 76 1 57 41 8 2 19 58 2 15 73 23.9 73 73 5 1
964 4 02 1 84 45 7 2 18 54 3 17 48 23 0 82 04 4 9965 4 21 2 11 50 1 2 10 49 9 18 71 22 5 87 71 4 8966 4 46 2 28 51 2 2 18 48 8 20 46 21 8 94 89 4 71 967 4 77 2 49 52 2 2 28 47 8 23 04 20 7 103 70 4 6
968 5 06 2 53 50 0 2 53 50 0 25 17 20 1 110 00 4 61969 5 08 2 49 49 0 2 59 51 0 28 54 17 8 120 95 4 2970 4 90 2 31 4/ 1 2 59 52 9 27 84 17 6 125 64 3 91971 5 21 2 37 45 5 2 84 54 5 29 11 17 9 140 81 3 7972 6 17 2 83 45 8 3 34 54 2 34 86 17 7 171 39 3 6973 7 81 3 58 45 8 4 23 54 2 44 12 17 7 223 14 3 5974 7 95 3 55 44 7 4 40 55 3 45 69 17 4 233 82 3 4975 10 22 4 45 43 5 5 77 56 5 60 47 16 9 300 59 3 41976 10 46 4 38 41 9 6 08 58 1 61 17 17 1 307 65 3 4
977 11 89 4 87 41 0 7 02 59 0 68 33 17 4 330 28 3 6
1978 14 99 6 31 42 1 8 68 57 9 88 70 16 9 416 39 3 6
979 18 12 7 83 43 2 10 29 56 8 107 86 16 8 489 73 3 7
i980 20 97 9 44 45 0 11 53 55 0 124 08 16 9 551 84 3 8
Sources for Table 3 There is considerable variation among French official 
sources and those of other national and international agencies with respect 
Lo French spending on defense, the division of expenditures between personnel 
and capital purchases the total of central governmental spending, and GNP 
Compare for example these differences in Trench official sources over a 
period of five years France, Assemblée Nationale, Commission de la Défense 
Nationale et des Torces Armées (1977), Avis sur le pro.iet de loi de finances 
£our 1978, No 3150, Défense Dépenses en capital, pp 13-17, idem, Commission 
des Tmance (1979), Rapport sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1980, No 
1292, Defense, Considérations Générales, pp 27, 81, 108-110, France, Sénat, 
Commission des Tinances (1980), Rapport Général Défense. No 98, p 7, and 
France Ministère de Défense SIRPA Le Budgèt de la défense national pour 
1981 (Pans 1981), pp 5-7 Defense expenditures are taken from Rapport 
No 1292 (1979), p 81 the percentage division between personnel and capital 
expenditures for 1960-1974 is drawn from Avis,No 3150 (1977), p 17 (initial 
budgeL figures) and from SIRPA, Le Budgèt de la défense national pour 1981. 
for 1975-1980 Central governmental expenditures percentages are taken 
from Avis No 3150 (1977), p 16 (initial budget figures) for 1960-1974 and 
from Sénat, Rapport,No 98 (1980), p 7, for 1975-1980 Percentage of GNP 
spent on defense, calculated in terras of the defense budget, is based on 
Senat, Ragpor^No 98 (1980), p 7, for 1960-1980 Percentages are rounded 
to nearest one—tenth of one percent
Lxchange races are taken from International Monetary Fund, International
Vno?nCial Stati3tlcs___ÜZZ» XXI, No 5 (May, 1977), pp 166-167 and idem. May,
1981 pp 152 Note discrepancies between IMF figures for GNP and those 
deriving from Trench parliamentary sources which are lower The differences 
are partly due to the different base on which GNP is calculated The 
parliamentary reports depend on calculations for produit intérieur brut,
a formula that generally leads to lower estimates of internal gross national
product
Note also that oscillations in the percentage increase in the budget 
are partly due to the rate of inflation m  France and the shifting exchange 
rate expressed in dollars For example, between 1969 and 1970, defense 
spending (crédit de paiements) increased from 26 4 to 27 19 billion francs 
However the rate of the franc declined relative to the dollar and, therefore, 
the dollar value of defense spending is shown to have fallen This distorted 
effect becomes especially acute after 1981 because of the devaluation of 
the Trench franc
These French sources conflict with other open literature sources for 
French defense spending GNP and central governmental expenditures Compare 
with U S , Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures 
and Arms Transfers 1970-1979 (Washington Government Printing Office, 1982),
P 38 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 
1982-1983 (London, 1982) p 124, and SIPRI World Armaments and Disarmaments 
Yearbook, 1982 (London Taylor and Francis, 1982), p 150 These latter 
three sources generally cite higher ratios for defense spending relative 
to GNP and central governmental expenditures than does the French Ministry 
of Defense or parliamentary reports
For an alternative calculation of defense spending estimates from 1945-1976, 
see Michel Martin, Warriors to Managers the French Military Establishment Since 
1945 (Chapel Hill University of North Carolina, 1981), p 54
ïthese purchasesor new^eap^ns^oúld not^e1^ 01'1?"^ t0 n0t® that “Uoh of 
nuclear forces and their support equipment ihiértfd Sí*0e th®y involv«d 
the defense industry in terms of the coat r.r *S plaoed an added burden on 
bolstered, ven before the ! ay events owe n í a wdapona Pressures, were
for excess reduction capacity öêfenf« í1' ? f*1®“ ’ t0 find forelS“ outlets 
specifically several of these econome ^  í3t®r Wlohel Debre oited 
determination to increase trench foreign derations in justifying his
'tetter balance in scheduling orders fn ? n E . “ l M  Ar"S Sales ldd bd * 
fi“ u°„e1d;s£]and^ therefore E x -
European Ws ta tes Pf>a ve P'iddipal
costs of weapons and the burden that th*v P ^  policy to control the risingIfïïiîr:;/:; s: s T - v - i r a r c r
• a s s r  »s%srs:;0ri,(
demand for arms, the figures do !,, 3uccessful response to global *
cost-cutting considerations formed a Da/t evidence that
important part— of the explanation fnèart” and in the 1 renoh case an 
transfers British and German defense In°rrt?3®d ar“S produ°tion and 
percent, respectively, while arms def? 3Pending increased by J( and 0/ 
each case .rench define ¿JeïïîL T 6 / 11 and * “ «nt in
In Ihear“? tranafers increased five-fold^ofl^i d°“bled durln« this period in the value of its arras transferred ins Ualy shows a net decline
attained in 1W2,  at the beginning of thè hif \ point in transfers was 
has since never been able to reach that lavel °°V®re(1 in Table a Italy
deflated its M t l S a t é s ^ í ^ p a n o e ^ í e 0 ^ ! ! ' * * “ 1 tranafer "Sures are
by a ratl° of approximately < to i* *'renoh Parliamentarycntish arms transfer data are u n d L Í  I There is also evidence that
similarly one can suspect that tSS «  t,d by a 2 to 1 ratio ^
tu"dr r lued Lven with a c w  d«if hoiiïn8 f r ltaly and ceroianytransfers over defense spending is Evident “°r® raPld rate of arma 
co-development and coIpèoductlonytoecut°Pef state ariDa suppliers is
France has entered into more £“" ^ 8 3! ! ^  í r  Lur°pean states sinoe I960 
the Atlantic Alliance xhe l renoh êSainU ™ *?h“ í*1®" a°y °ther "0B,ber of 
Western curope, is in advance of the tèè^  ’ tbe largeat arms producer in 
suppliers which are turning înSrcM?n«îî ? a“ 0” 8 other West European 
production schemes as a way out of thf J01nt devel°P“ent anday out of the impasse of high defense costs
as developed stèt« in3^coS^ging°ind«ehad th® 3a“® effeot 00 dev* oping 
economic considerations underlying t h l ^ è  ar"S production althoughthe 
than those driving arms production decisl^3"310!! ar® aomewhat different 
developed states appear initially c o n c e ^ T a b ^ ^
TABLE 4
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND ARMS TRANSFERS 
OF SELECTED WEST EUROPEAN STATES 
1972-19771
(in billions of current dollars)
UNITED WEST
ITALY___________ FRANCE______________KINGDOM___________ GERMANY
Defense
Expen­
ditures
Arms
Trans­
fers
Defense
Expen­
ditures
Arras
Trans-
fers^
Defense
Expen­
ditures
Arms
Trans­
fers
Defense
Expen­
ditures
Arms
Trans­
fers
1972 4 2 19 10 0 8 9 3 46 12 7 32
1973 4 4 12 10 8 1 2 10 0 6 14 1 12
19 74 4 8 10 12 0 1 4 11 1 55 16 1 21
1975 4 9 7 13 6 1 9 11 9 53 17 5 42
1976 5 0 14 14 9 2 4 13 0 68 18 4 70
1977 5 7 14 16 5 3 0 13 5 88 19 4 90
19 78 6 2 15 18 6 3 8 14 6 1 2 21 4 95
1979 7 2 11 121 0 4 8 16 5 1 0 23 7 93
Source U S Arras Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures
and Arras Transfers (Washington, D C , 1982), pp 58-59, 63, 80, 100-101,
Note that figures for Trench arms exports are derived directly from French parliamen­
tary reports and subsequently translated into current exchange rates For French 
figures see France Assemblée Nationale, Commission des Finances, de l’Economie 
Generale et du Plan Rapport sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1981. No 1976, 
Défense^  Depenses en Capital October 9, 1980 p 196 and International Monetary 
Fund International Financial Statistics 1977, XXI, No 5 (May 1977) pp 166-167 
and ibid May, 1981 p 152 Slight differences in citations between table and 
sources are due to rounding
\
SELECTED JOINT MILITARY DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION PROGRAMS 
BETWEEN FRANCE AND OTHER EUROPEAN STATES
10 GRAM
COOPERATING
NATIONS
MAJOR CONTRACTED OR 
CONTRACTORS START OF STUDY SERVICETransall(transport)
lantique (marine 
patrol aircraft)
West Germany(G)
West Cermany(G) 
Great Britian(GB) 
Belgium(B), 
Netherlands(N)
Nord Aviation, 
MBB(G), Fokker(N) 
Bréguet, Sud-Aviation 
Dornier(G) Rolls 
Royce(GB), ABAP(B), 
Fokker(N)
1959
1960
Army/Air Fore 
Navy/Air Fore
4awk SAM 
ssile
Italy(I) G 
B, N
Consortium under 
SETEL grouped around 
Thomson-Hous ton
1960 Army
rtel ASM anti- 
ciar(AS 37) TV 
guided version(AJ168)
GB Matra and Hawker- 
Siddeley
1963 Air Force/ 
Navy
lan
ti-tank missile
G Euromissile(composed 
of Aérospatiale and 
MBB)
1964 Army
t G Euromissile 1964 Army
land I(clear 
ather) and II 
vdl weather)SAM
G Euromissile 1964 Army
guar dual purpose 
aining and attack 
aircraf t(vanous 
dels)
GB SEPECAT, grouping 
British Aircraft Cor­
pora t ion (BAC) and 
Dassault-Bréguet motors 
by Rolls-Royce and 
Turboméca
1964 Air Force
licogters
Puma
Gazelle
Lynx
GB Puma/Gazelle Aerospa­
tiale and Turboméca, 
Lynx(Westland and 
Rolls Royce)
1967 Air Force/ 
Amy
¿Exocet AM 38 and GB 
3 9,air-to-surface(ASM)
A. naval missile
Aérospatiale, BAC 
Hawker-Siddeley
1967 Air Force 
(AM 39) 
Navy (AM 38 
AM 39)
Dha-Jet G Dassault-Bréguet and 
Dornier(airframe), SNECMA, 
Turboméca,MTU and KHD 
(motors)
1969 Air Force
utomat(SSM ASM) 
/02veral successive 
rsions)
I Matra, Thompson CSF, 
Thomson-Brandt, Turboméca 
SNPE, Oto Melara
1969 Navy
iLL 5 Page 2
0-ASSM G
ìH-2/HAC G
licopter
i>-2L, ASM G
>pard/AMX G
0 Tank
Luromisbilc 19773
Euromissile 19783
Euromissile 19783
GIAT, Krauss-Maffei 
& Krupp
19803
)urce Various sources have been consulted Most important is the annual review of world 
armaments, issued by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (SIPRI) ,
World Armaments and Disarmament The SIPRI Yearbook, 1962-1980, Jane’s All the
—g Aircraft (London MacDonald 1959-/j) Defense Marketing Systems, Foreign 
Military Markets France (Greenwich, Conn ) and France, Assemblée Nationale, 
Commission de la Defense Nationale et des Forces Armées Avis sur le prolet de 
xoi de finances pour 1975 Défense Dépenses en capital, No 1233, pp 93-96
ihc sources are not always clear on these two points, the official accord between 
governments and the start of study and design of the project by one or more states
Design is French production essentially licensed by France to Great Britian
These projects are in the development stage
I
tì
down, developing states appear more focused on the problem of acmiirinr
ëxoaeot%:r o1tî0hnir 1ikn0H-h0V' d6Spit6 low ^rd - c u r «  ' e r “ 8
foreign reserves of a develoDing «tat«, 1 tbe short-run, however, the 
on its capacity to acquire arm2 13 ° f the restraints
recently observed 006 study of indian defense policy
fhe dependence of defence production on foreign
13 0tUy about 10 percent of the total defence 
exnana íUre but Sln0e about 10 Percent of the defenceS
°nd Although SteadypoanP
th^a^ : ”i*a°nt>bbbh<Dcomponents^and technical0know-howa  ^
u ?eieratlng pace of development in military * 
thehrnd°e7i„\bn a fumtauree 3^ h d6p6nd6b°6 ^evitable for
inadeqS«""foÎSÎ»tM a w v M * W*îtaîaÂs“M nâstâ íeUabÍe* °°nStraints of
balance of payments'"pos!tío"8 îhe pr^ l e T o ?  ^ ? ^  " a f 6 ’3 pr6oaplou3
deterrent to d e v e l o p i n g L  . not aPP«ar aa a
earlier, have approximately doubled s i n c e r o  Pr°dU°lns 3tates- as noted
exterior dependency appear^tl^«^«^™0 fr6e the“3®lves increasingly of 
producing states listed m  Table 2 accordi classifies the 2Ô arms
that each has reached along a scaL of sïx ?evel3hofdeVelOP,nenta;i Sta«6 independent arms development and nmn f1 levels of increasingly 1980 m e  growth in inïîv«nf d Production capability between 1970 and 
Xhe development is across al^ma^or Produotlon capabilities is impressive 
armored vehicles, tactical missiles, an^navarves^ls”01““1"8 air0raft>
systermodìficaLon\nneverLaengtneerf ^  r6aohed the fourth 3bae® of 
acquisition and development o r tech¿icar 3g i ? r r í*1* t6" y6ar P6Plod The 
these states m  the next Secade to h»roì 3k*lla at this lavel Position 
producing selected weapons although i-h 6 alm^st totally independent in
f lgh ter °aircraft ^ particularly ^P6d^a^^aedrandl d and®dr*”slds^blikeent ^  
ssiies, israel m  air-to-ground, surface-to-surfaoe, and, with
9iaiwan, in anti-tank missiles
and an access toSadÎaLedetechnoîogîSa3npart3Vof1thelll0enr d aeree“«nts weapons i^jle / lists th«» n nono^  p rts tb®ir contract to purchase
developing states and developed st^te^sunnM ^  f°r°e betwean 
clearly on the rise from what was the nfff11*1"3 buch arrangements are 
sales were restricted to the sale of end if™ ^  ^  1960s when most arms 
continue into the 1900s as reef¿feff e?d i  °?S ^is trend is likely to 
arms but also to increasingly i , .  V Utes insist on access not only to 
contracturai relations are i n s t i t u t f o n f i f f f ta*7 tfchnolo«y As these 
expected to move further along thfÍ!fíof!fd * developing states can be 
least in areas of low or fedfum fLhfni weapons independence, at
be expected to join the ranks of developed 3 tateSPr0dU0inS °enters oan als0
devel¿p!ngr3tate°prodücer3f w î u  graduaíxv'con?“1'’^ 8 ‘"°re know-how x» that 
and very likely begin to seeksimilarsJíutíol 1  h'3"' 00st Prot>ie®a
and joint development and productionartín»«» . hf gh lnorea3«<* oxport 
developed states before them Adîanoaa 8 tS in imitatlon of the
world, like Israel, brazil, and India are^lread^f061”3 10 th° devel°Pi*»6
appear to be adopting the same strategies as thedWeíf°íLn8 these ohoioe3 and 
to some extent, the superpowers as weft fn the West Luropean states and,
in insisting on expanded joint military and civi^"® f°r axport outlets and 
for arms purchases increasingly Ministers o f ^ 13" vfnturea to compensate 
joining Ministers of befense Z À Ì T Z t  " "
national arms producingdcentersaisrthnf°r0e 3" lnorease or a bolstering of 
aupply sources' Wore f ta tes tha^ ever ^ o ™ 33^ 6 " » • « « i o . t i o n  of 
oe consciously attempting to avoid beinf Í since World War il appear to 
small group of state? ^ J  t r e n i  Ì  A  °n any one state or
increasing number of suppliers who will be « l 6! °PGn n*W outlats *>r an 
and to encourage the extension of thm h aß?f t0 servica these markets 
profitable to arms a u p ? n ? £  ? r « a? d J diversification process so 
complexes maintain their arms industrial
an^ l I^V^lonmenh.i T nmnli 1 YPH 
t o  frotiUfift.and Transfer t r m
incentives arisi^frof0?ffat^gff-poiitifal&d f *** derivativ® bonomie 
and on how these economic considerations are ffffr?inantS °f arma Production 
calculations of national decision-makif* ^  aacendan°y in the
transfers can also be viewed as a -«„í 8 1 ? Arms Production and
sold like any other economic product in ^11**°* thaf Ca” be boufiht a«d 
would appear that developed state sunniif ßreater or lesser measure it 
ihe rrench are perhaps the most unambiffff™ VkGW ar°S salas in this light 
commodity and vehicl? of economic IxìhìnlT treating arms as a
have progressively assumed a life of thfff Weapons Production and sales 
or strategic objectives that may have ifffifn v ^ °hfd fr0® the PoUtical 
develop weapons indigenously ïndfr t h f s pr0“pted a ^ i a i o n  to 
national defense but goods and a e r i l i  \ ßulse» arms ar® not tools oí 
national welfare, economic growth and hfff3* 3flG iS beneficial for 
personal and corporate profit ^  ¿ h gh ^ ^ " « n t  aa well as for
TABLE 71
LICENCED ARMS PRODUCTION ACCORDS ACQUIRED 
BY DEVELOPING STATES, 1970-1980*
_________________ 1970-80
Aircraft
Naval
Vessels
Armored
Vehicles
Tactical
Missiles
Argentina 2 4 2
Brazil 6 1
Chile 1
Egypt 2 1
India 7 1 1 1
Indonesla 3 1
Israel 1
North Korea 1
South Korea 4 1
Libya 1
Mexico 1
Nigeria 1
Pakistan 2 1 1
Peru 1
Philippines 1
South Africa 2 1 1 1
Taiwan 4 1
TOTALS 35 11 7 6
SIPRI, World Armaments and Disarmament (Cambridge Oelgeschlager. Gunn,
and Hain, 1981) pp 252-257
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gain some°notion Wlth apBa deliveries, „e can
1 rench economy Ihese toiall í f  °f armS p«>ducti<m to the
impact of arms production since preciseydat a ^ r r n o t 1“3^?! ^  eoonomlc 
with respect to the contribution of the arms ì n d , , ^  P?bUoly available 
r rench econo ay or to the economy as a whole X ®a0h seotor ° e fcbe
foreign demand for trench arms and iabl? 0 combines domestic and
' amover by these measures "? b u s i n g  Î  ° deliverias to business 
value of arms produced for saies to ,rLÍ!ír“T í  Ín arma pl,0duotlon, the 
from H  billion m  1972 to $7 Ö6 b ^ U o n ^ n  f c y f 8" " T * “ fopoes «‘«“‘»led 
index of industrial prices during the same Der,ía7\ ?  Pat® fastep than the increasing proportion of french ?rm. same period Also revealing is the
1972, this ratio atood at 0 percent and ? t0 ‘>u3iness turnover® in 
approximately three percentage a ^ a ^ T ?  p e ^ l n “^ /,
he measured"*byatheeratiol°oftaros^deliverie3eto^theCl0meS^10 <*"a“d “ay a^the defense budget from 1972 through19/^ 1 t h e Proour«“ent budget of 
over this period m  1 9 /¿, the ratio “0re than doubles
later the ratio of arms saies to domestic d /  f  J pepoent blva V^ra 
implications of these measures is »Ü!! demand grew to 61 H percent ihe 
industry has remained relatively static over8th Wi*ile the size of the arms
" ,  r  - - . s ; . , ,
Si S/ïïï“ " lì" “ ^
m  GAP During this five year period ^the v » / “  «»’eater than the growth
only is trance'^"trad^position sign!fíianí!l T *  hot
■ r " r~  "  —  *■»»«,,,.. «
three percent of over-all Imports in 19/2 to“u 5ransfers have grown from 
a substantial and growing proportion o? french 5 P!POent ln 19/7 Ihis is 
a supplement to the defense budget offsettfnÜ fh3*1^  Apin3 are not “erely 
development and production, they are intevm ? 8 h® hi8h °°at of weapons 
competitive position in international »nef f °°“>P°nents of trance's 
rising dependence on arms transfers i s  * lhe lmportanc« of this
dependency on international trade to t6d by i,ranoe's over-all
trade represented approximately 20 nonost^ n eeonomic growth In 1955 
one-third of France's GhP was trfde related° ’ tW*nty years later'
arms 1 ^ % / ™  a Í L ^ y ^ ^ ^ n L ^ f of Payments, 
of oil more than quadrupled between ^ / ^ a n d  ig/7 PerJ'ty Iha 00st t0  
10/ U  9 billion in 197/ Arms saïes covert ! /?’ r*3Anfi Vrom *2 < P ^ ü o n  
oil imports in 19/2, this percentage V e i l t o V approx*mftely 30% of French 
a«ain to 251 m  1977 f h e ^ m p ^ i f  “  ¿ ^ r f ^ u i ^
TABLE 8 1
ESTIMATED BUSINESS TURNOVER FOR FRENCH 
ARMAMENT INDUSTRY
1 9 7 2-1 9 7/
(in billions of dollars) 
1972 1973 1974 1 9 75 1976 1977
1 Domestic Procurement 2 83 3 58 3 55  ^ 1*5 4 38 4 87
2 Delivery of arms to
other states 80 1 175 1 386 1 9 4 4 2 435 2 992
TOTAL 1 and 2 3 63 4 755 4 936 6 394 6 815 7 862
Percentage of arms sales
to business turnover 22 0 24 7 28 1 30 4 35 7 38 1
Percentage of arms sales
to domestic procurement 28 3 32 8 39 0 43 7 55 6 61 4
Source France, Assemblée 
Forces Armées, Avis sur le Nationale, Commission de la Défense Nationale et
Commission des * manees de T'Eonnnmi J A  *r?nce» Assemblee Nationale, 
le nroiPt de loi ri» fi„an... n„,lr. 1QRn et (CFEGP), flappprt ,Hir
1292 2 Ootobe^ 1979 Exchange ratea T ? flonaittóratlnna CinSrñlm, ne
^ .rnau ?n,l M n ^ l U  W 7 ,and (May 1981), p 152
27
TABLE 9 1
BUSINESS TURNOVER FOR ARMS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP 
(in billions of dollars)
1972 1973 1 9 7« 1975 1976 1977
business Turnover 3 63 4 755 it 936 6 394 6 815 7 862
GNP 171 39 223 14 233 82 300 59 307 65 330 28
Percentage 2 12 2 13 2 11 2 13 2 22 2 38
1 Source See Tables 8 and 3
4TABLE IO1
ARMS TRANSFERS RELATED TO EXPORTS, OIL IMPORTS 
AND COMMERICAL BALANCES
(in billions of dollars)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
PORTS 26 43 36 48 46 16 53 01 57 16 64 97
rms delivenes/Exports 3 3 2 3 0 3 7 4 3 4 6
L IMPORTS 2 7 3 5 9 8 9 7 11 5 11 9
\rms delivenes/Oil imports 29 6 33 6 14 1 20 21 2 25 1
PORTS 27 0 37 55 52 84 53 94 64 46 70 50
lance Exports and - 57 -1 07 -6 68 - 93 -7 30 -5 53ports
^nns Sales 80 1 175 1 386 1 944 2 435 2 992
ricit without
rms Sales -1 37 -2 245 -8 066 -2 874 -9 735 -8 522
Source France, Assemblee Nationale, Commission de la Defense Nationale et des 
Torces Armees, Avis sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1978r Defense. 
Dépenses en Capital. 11 October 1977, and France, Assemblée Nationale, 
Commission des Finances de l'Economie Generale et du Plan (CFEGP), Rapport sur
le. .pro.iet ds loi te., finances,, pour 1990.__ Défense,.__Conaidéizationa Générales,
no 1292, 2 October 1979 Exchange rate export, import, and oil import data 
drawn from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
1977. XXI, no 5 (May 19/7), pp 166-7, and (May 19Ö1), p 152
»
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?!????!?? ? ?°h arms sales merely to maintain the ratio of arms
íoÍÍ a t0 011 lmports of the Pre-oil crisis period While civilian 
fmnnrt- SerV10®s certainly contributed their share to conserving oil 
Í Z x l a r l v a rm \ T ^  comprised a larger proportion of the increase 
Similarly o ms deliveries account for a notable share of trance's efforts 
to maintain an equilibrium in trade As iable 10 suggests ÍÜÜh
armsndPiiWOUld ^  ^  S12eable if * * *  not been able to step up its arms deliveries In the absence of arms deliveries deficit-«! in
m  deficits mi^h/have Ì Z r À ì l l  £  S î l U o S ' u ^ ’s f b U U o n ^  ^
capital1«oodrOVldedf3lSnifl0ant lmpetus to th« expansion*?» f**franeéis 
increased°by% b ï PbetweenÜ19/¡taand01976aÍheíPOrtS ^  - “ -ted to have
s r i  Sä S t ’’competitors within the OoCD Arms delive??»? ?! principal
significant share of trance's trade u!!? ?! á moreover, account ior aiiztzi v ?,t -  ~Ärr;». ä¡.’--SS^S 1 " i  s"« SÄ SffSSKJU-“"- “
x r s s . ' s . - s . - ss ràs3! ^ 5^ -
followed ?y !?h??f to s!udi !rf!f! lhis 3pectacular sale wasthe 19b0s S 1 Arabla and lra9 throughout the 1970s and into
attribru:er:onoLv3:?:ie3:a!wet3?reìafedar“cro?sm!!siìry ir0010**0an betags associated with trench arms and the 3 b ® 3d,des the attractive price 
arrangements and compe??a?lon? eften i^l?!??63310”3?* finanoial American preoccupation with the Vietnam edin contracts for trench arms 
markets foi trench oíders ?s !me??cañar durin6 bb® « M s  °P«ned new
war and to the needs 0f Z l Z l e ü  .???“ ' h'ar“3 produ°tion was geared to the
and abetted by governmental officials were ^ c k ^ r f ? ! ? 01“ "63 ’ ®n00ura8«d 
demand Other potential competitors, like Créât Britaiit ufT'!”6 WOrld 
Japan, were either unable or unwilling te W®3t Ger“any, and
government under Labor Par!? r u l e  ì ì  L I  d ì ì  ?h<\ vold lh® Britishs s r r  ;ssrs
.r.1-:ï,:r;x,°iuSr,s.rsiL““râ Ä r  a
HrEHF“- “”1“— » a  o”1:;,1«,“ ";.rv
complex . ™ : , “ s r . î ~ . l“ cLT;î.:,
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affordeo t e c h r ^ r " 6" 1 ‘W 01’ 1 “ " ^ ® 3 -considerable ihese v s m J  J i skilled, technical personnel, were
advantage ^  3dlIin6°“imaa"broaditl0al i 3 ° t 0 r 3  « * "  “ 'an®® *
substantially stable f ^ r t h e ^ t r i c ú o r ^ r ^ h 1^  p®r3onnel> remained 
decreasing demand for procurement Ov k 2 ° ï*16 1980s d®3plt® a 
social and potentially disruptivi demandai “1*ltary f o r o « 3 and continued 
expenditures, economic growth and *? lnoreased sooial
employs approximately dOO.OOo’»“ « ^ .  ? Ï" “ 6 ^  aroS industry
number has not appreciably changed over°thÌ iÌÌÌ^Ì8" ^  3”d Morkers and this 
this work force devoted to arms sales abroad hft d®oade ihe proportion of 
(rench arms industry becomes more ex?or? den d ? °°Urse incr®a3«d as the 
“r"s ^ales were progressively viewed^s a ‘0r t'r®noil Planners,
Otherwise be sustained by domestic demand I n *  1 o u t p u t that could not
civilian sales abroad Froducing arms is an < 3,.a coopieaient to sagging 
social welfare Arms also act a! produc? U“ent of economic and
and to open markets for civilian goods and ?er$iMs° t r 3 d 6 abr°ad
advantage1^ still o p " , “ “ " 1* tbe eoono“^  notion of comparative
endeavors it i ^ b y no ^ L / Z t ^ c t ^ t n  *" iB 0lVllla" o c o n ^ Ì c  
esides the superpowers have been able to carve^t-ar“f since other states 
heir specialized products among develoDina »? ?Ut salected markets for 
to a lesser extent, India, have enjoyed somf * t a t e a ' Israel» Brazil, and, 
Israel has reached world stature as a suoni i suc£ess as arms suppliers 
indigenously produced, like the Gabriel Ppl^er of Quality products, some 
adapted from the technology o? ití a¿D¿i?!Írfa0?:,t0"8Urfaoe or
patterned after the rrench^ira ^  ‘SrS’ like fightet,
engines ße airfrarae and powered by ÜS-built GL
including West Germany^lndoneLa^South^f0! t0 3 “lde ranfi® of customers 
tcuador, hexico, H o n d e a s , ?„d Sin«ap°p®. lalwan, Chile?’
has reportedly sold war materiel ?oin?? ái ?w \ re°ently> Nicaragua It 
between the two states have been s?vÌr™ al^ough diplomatic relations 
all forms of tactical missiles ( i ??? Ü d 11 lso Pro<*uces civil aircraft 
vehicles, artillery and s ^ l i ^ s  ^ r "  ^  2>’ P a t r0 1 b0ats- a ™ ° ™  
systems, industrial and shipborne monitori?ommunication, and navigation 
electronics, microelectronics, computers and ™ d o d n tro 1 systems, medical 
systems, fire control systems secSiurs???emrPU^ rlZed ®°“““nicatlons 
equipment, ground-support equipment and m, ’ 3ir and Sround.crew 
lists exports of *2;,o million for 1979 a /»irowave components 2' ACCA 
conservative 20 » a fißure that ia likely to be
must be considered anCimportantaarmaSaun ^  fUddle Last and Africa and 
sold equipment, especially light armoredP U ?r in the Middle East, it has 
Iraq Ahe Cascaveï, a lighí t0 ^  and
and carries laser range -finders has seen Q h?fc mounts a 90 mm cannon 
in the war with Iran ^razil?s sta^e l l l L i ™ 1 0 * Wlth lraqi armed forcea 
Aeronautica (hmbraer) is the ««rO/M ? d bmpresa krasileira de
t,e twin-engine B a n d i i ^ a S S í A  îÍ Í Í S w M  a ^ 0" ^wuriawiae and also manufactures the
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Xavante jet under Italian license Brazilian arms are also attractive to 
developed states ihe United ôtâtes Narines are studying a brazilian light 
tank for possible purchase, and lranee has already purchased Brazilian 
light trans,ort aircraft for its armed forces Brazil is likely to 
c o m m u e  to invest m  its arms industry in the future As one close student 
oí Brazilian politics and foreign and security policy observes
Brazilian arms are especially attractive to third-world 
countries since they are comparatively simple, high quality, 
and free of ideological ties Because of the growing demand 
for Brazilian arms, and given that Brazil must increase 
exports to compensate for rising petroleum prices, the state 
continues to assign a high priority to investment in 
what already ij the largest and moat sophisticated 
conventional-weapons industry in Bouth America As a major 
arms supplier, Brazil will be able to exert greater 
pressure on its neighbors and to increase its 
influence in the emerging commercial markets oí black 
Africa, the Middle Bast, and Asia
rt»v»i!,r0m tW? °pposlng viewpoints— developed state suppliers and emerging 
gains tonL a™art f “S t“*re appear to be attraotlve economic ®
suInLen ? Producing and selling arms lor the established
supplier, like trance, there is a comparative advantage to selling military 
hardware and technology over other possible investment possibilities tor *  
the emerging arms producer, there may also be gain to be had in reducing
mole Irari°í/0rf18n reserves and ln Penetrating markets previously held^y
derive from r t  3uppllers These real an<* perceived economic benefits derive from a logic driven either by the notion of bounded rationality
(where strategic-political considerations irame techno-economic decisions)
Z e Z  I"“ Z V e l0 p m e n t a l econo“103 (where welfare and pro?iI ar t  t h epredominant motivations)
ihere is much force in the argument that spending resources on arms 
reduces what can be devoted to welfare, and there is oonl^ërabL 
documentation comparing expenditures Tor both objectives 30 However,
nai-ir.reilaH10nSI1P 13 far from being a zero-sum game as perceived by national decision-makers concerned with security and welfare problems 31
as this paper has suggested, there are powerful economic and technological 
incentives that prompt decision-makers to invest in arms production At 
least in the short and middle term, marginal gains appear to be 
orthcoming, justifying the original investment It does little good to 
argue with the leadership of these national production centers that they are 
wasting national resources, much less does the argument cut that global7 
IIIIII063 a r e . b? l “ 8 squandered with the result that regional and world
w3re llkely to rlse These considerations apparently have lesser 
weight when one examines the specific decision taken by decision-makers at 
the national level where resource allocation goes on Announced commitment 
to arms control goals or to a decrease in arms traffic are repeatedly 
subordinated by arms producing states to the continued expansion of 
military production and transfers Ihe effort of the Carter administration 
to cut American arms transfers had already failed before the Reagan regime 
further relaxed barriers to sales abroad The Giscard d ’tstaing government 
and the succeeding ¡socialist regime in trance, while both deploring arms
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i h?Ve presided over the greatest expansion of arms transfers in rrance s history Neutralist governments m  India and brazil, while 
critical of superpower arms policies, are committed to the expansion and 
Î ! T ™ nt thelr ar”3 produoln* aad marketing c a p a b i l i t i e s l Z iannn 8 f economic and military planning, going further than some
r t f  ::: lhe urazlllan leadership is no less bent on a policy
goal may appear0“ 2 “ “ 10 lndependence- ho«ever doubtful or illusory that
borne analysts in the developing world are prepared to argue that 
economic development can actually be spurred either as a sp!nf“ff of 
military preparedness or further, as a direct result of militarv
t e r m s ' ïfefhG lhe welfare-defense debate may be characterized in these 
H Lhe PredorainanL opinion within India still views defense
-pending as an economic burden, influential segments of the security
technological^gain” 8 turthe^'°dU°tlon 13 the ^ r c s c U o n  of economic and
untarmi pi-oS^tio“ ^ " “ ^  pS?ÏT‘T  ^ ^ • “ • ^ ^ « • ‘Xending
jl îss  xssz **
to specific case studies of the behavior of s any guide, and if reference 
ourope, Israel brazil and Î L  ° natlonal leaders in Western
must sacrifice * we 1 fare * for nulitarrnr307 indication, the argument that one
universally accepted I-any go bevond th^" “ V î ? 6 V3rsa 13 *>* np “ea^  more butter beoansp nf gun3 Y guns-butter trade-off and argue
C onclu sions
of th^bîhrvior^ofHeli te^concerned^ith a»d saies and
FOOI NO I Li,
/ ndrew Fierre, J he G l9.fr al Polities_oí Arms bales (Princeton
Prince tor University Press, 1 9 0 ¿ ) See also his article, "Arms bales lhe 
jew Diplcnacy, " Lareiftn Affairs, LX No ¿ (Winter 1901-19tí¿),
iíchael íioodie, "defense Industries m  the lhird World Problems
and Promises, " in Auma lrang£e.rs in the Modern World, eds Stephanie G
Neuman and fiobet t, Harkavy (New ïork Praeger, 1979, p 300
host of the writers in the Neuman-Harkavy reader on arms
transfers, for example, accent strategic-political explanations of arms 
transfers See ibid
Haju G G ihomds, IhS Defence of lndld (Delhi Macmillan,
19 /Ö) p ij5
1 or an initial effort to model the economics of arms production 
transfers, and acquisition, see Arthur Alexander, William P butz, and
*"n°tlpninüí'!íaílca’ Ü9ltl! H nK J'radUfí.tlgn <?f International made of Arms. Ul.,.LÇgnçnas tranieWOrk for Analyzing Policy Alternati ves. Rand 
Corporation, Santa Monica, California, harch, 19dl, p 1
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